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Abstract
The main aim of  this article is to show how some philosophical concepts developed in the 
period of  the Upaniṣads — the most important time for building the contextual background 
for further philosophical speculations — as well as to contribute to the discussion how on 
the base of  introspective experiences formed the Upaniṣadic view of  the world and how that 
view could have been adopted in Advaita thought.
The topic of  this article is to show the relation between two dimensions of  reality; one of  
them is denoted by the term akṣarātman — ‘imperishable ātman’, which is related to the 
Absolute dimension, and the other by the term vijňānātman — ‘reasonable ātman’, which 
is related to the empirical perspective of  reality. The term vijňānātman occurs only twice in 
the classical Upaniṣads. We can find it in the Praśna. This analysis follows the hermeneutical 
methodology. All consideration are based on the main text of  the Praśna with some additional 
remarks to the other texts belonging to the line of  the Atharvaveda, to the Muṇḍaka and to 
the Māṇḍūkya. The leading idea of  the Praśna and Muṇḍaka is the deliberation between parā 
(higher) and aparā vidyā (lower wisdom), and the special emphasis devoted to describing the 
details of  yogic procedures.
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Artykuł ukazał się w polskiej wersji językowej pod tytułem Analiza pojęcia widźnianatman w kontekście ad-
waitycznej interpretacji relacji pomiędzy podmiotem absolutnym a względnym, “Studia Litteraria Universitatis Iagel-
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The period of  the Upaniṣads is the most important time for developing philosophical specu-
lations that, over the following centuries, would be shaped to particular schools — darśanas. 
During that time a plethora of  ideas, concepts and concrete terms started to appear. Initially, 
many of  them were used metaphorically but later on, some of  them would be treated as 
technical terms, for precise ideas, while others would still retain their ambiguous meaning. 
In this paper I will focus, due to the above context, on one term only — the vijňānātman, 
the ‘reasonable ātman’ that occurs in the canon texts only twice. All the considerations will 
be based on the texts belonging to the line of  the Atharvaveda. I would like to show that 
these three texts — the Praśna, Muḍaka, Māṇḍūkya — have a common special interest in 
yogic, ascetic procedures. Their authors elaborated a specific paradigm for the reality that 
would have occupied a significant position in the later philosophical schools, especially in Ad-
vaita and Yoga. In this analysis, I refer to the sources texts, to commentaries on the Upaniṣads, 
and to the Gauḍapāda written by Śaṃkara.  
As is widely known, the relation between the Absolute Subject and the empirical subject 
is one of  the leading topics in the philosophy of  Advaita Vedānta. Reflections on the topic 
do not only focus on a simple analysis of  the essence of  the being but, more importantly, 
they also discuss the relation between the Absolute dimension of  reality and the objective, 
depicted, empirical reality. According to the sources, the nature of  the Absolute Subject does 
not require any reconstruction; it has already been defined in śruti and is generally accepted 
in the texts of  the Advaita tradition as a record of  authority. It has also been expressed in 
many passages of  the Upaniṣads; for the purposes of  these reflections I will assume the well-
known definition of  the Absolute Subject formulated in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1: sat 
ekam advitīyam — ‘one only, existing without a second’. A precise description of  the nature 
of  the empirical subject proves far more problematic. In this case we are faced with a num-
ber of  questions which should precede any statements with regards to the issue at hand. One 
such question is whether it is more important to point out the primary attributes defining the 
empirical subject or if  one should rather focus on the function and the role of  the subject. 
Attempts at a precise resolution of  these problems that aim at a technical, accurate descrip-
tion of  the nature of  the empirical subject and how it functions in the world are present in 
the oldest texts which form the Advaita tradition, such as those of  Gauḍapāda, Śaṃkara and 
their direct students’ as well as the continuators of  their thought throughout the subsequent 
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centuries. All such considerations refer to śruti, either directly or indirectly, as it is in those 
texts — especially the Upaniṣads — that Advaitins seek inspiration, or rather justification for 
their resolutions. In this short draft, I will try to contribute to the discussion on the topic. 
The relation mentioned in its title will be presented based on an analysis of  the dimension 
of  the Absolute Subject in relation to that of  the empirical subject, expressed in the terms 
akṣarātman and vijňānātman. The term — or rather the expression 1 — vijňāna ātman only 
appears twice throughout the whole canon of  classical Upaniṣads, and in one specific text — 
Praśna 4.9. and Praśna 4.11.
The Praśna Upaniṣad belongs to the Atharvaveda lineage, along with two other Upani-
shads — Muṇḍaka and Māṇḍūkya. The close relation between the Muṇḍaka and the Praśna 
is indicated by Śaṃkara in the first words of  the commentary on the Praśna 2. One of  the 
main motifs of  both Upaniṣads is a reflection on the relation between the Absolute and 
relative dimensions of  the reality, as well as one on the difference between higher and lower 
knowledge — parā / aparā vidyā 3. In the classical, later tradition of  Advaita, and even in the 
Māṇḍūkya we can already notice a fairly radical distinction between higher knowledge, which 
is pure sat, described as Brahman, and the dimension of  empirical, conventional reality — 
vyāvahārika. Even though both the Praśna and Muṇḍaka point out the difference explicitly, 
neither of  them radically depreciates the dimension of  empirical reality. At this point we 
come across some discrepancies. The Muṇḍaka (2.2.8) even states: “When one sees him — 
both the high and the low”. However, the detailed discussion of  the relation between the 
concepts of  para / apara and the entities denoted by them in different Upaniṣads of  the 
canon is a topic worthy of  at least a separate paper.
The present considerations are then mainly restricted to an analysis and interpretation 
of  a fragment of  a single text, albeit also including some references to other pieces of  the 
canon where necessary. Hence, in my analysis of  the notion of  vijňānātman the reflections 
are mainly based on the Praśna, while some explications and clarifications draw upon the 
Muṇḍaka and Māṇḍūkya. The Māṇḍūkya is, in this case, of  crucial importance not just be-
cause it is also a text belonging to the Atharvaveda. It is, in a sense, a text that lies betwixt 
the philosophical contents expressed poetically or metaphorically and the terse, technical 
language of  the sutras. I take the Māṇḍūkya not only as an Upaniṣad, as it can be formally 
described, but also as the oldest sutra of  the Advaita tradition.
The nature of  the highest reality and how to achieve it is described in the text in the 
form of  six questions (praśna — as indicated by the title) and their answers. As one could 
remark — a classic topic for the Upaniṣads. What distinguishes this Upaniṣad from other 
texts in the canon is an in-depth reflection on prāṇa and the procedures of  prāṇayama, far 
more thorough than in other classical texts. For the same reason it is classified as one of  
1 The words vijňāna as well as ātman both appear much more often by themselves than in phrases. 
2 This brāhmaṇa, Vedic explanatory text, is commenced to explain, in elaborate terms, what the mantras [of  the 
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad ] have already stated. The narrative form, embodying a dialogue among seers, is adopted for 
the purpose of  highlighting the exacting seriousness of  Self-knowledge (Gupta 1991: 351). 
3 As the scholars of  Brahman say, one should achieve two types of  knowledge — the higher and the lower. The 
lower knowledge is: the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the Atharvaveda, phonetics, the ritual science, 
grammar, etymology, metrics, and astronomy. The higher knowledge, in contrast, is that by which one grasps the 
imperishable (Muṇḍaka 1.1.4−5.) All excerpts off  Muṇḍaka, Praśna and Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads in the present 
article are taken from Olivelle (2008). 
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the so-called Sāṃkhya-yogic Upaniṣads. According to Zysk (2007: 107) the Muṇḍaka and 
Praśna concentrate largely on the analysis of  prāṇa and the explanation of  the procedure 
of  prāṇayama and are considered to be related to an ancient group of  ascetics called Vrātya. 
However, to this day no consensus has been reached among Indologists as to who exactly 
the Vrātyas were 4. What is important for our considerations is that we can be sure that they 
were a group of  ascetics, Śramaṇas functioning within the orthodox strand, rather than Brah-
mins, specialized in and periodically performing very detailed rituals and sacrificial ceremo-
nies. Therefore, based on their personal experiences, the Vrātyas would discuss and analyse 
various techniques and procedures related to the breath of  life. As Zysk (2007: 107) points 
out, the three levels of  prāṇa’s meaning, which would later become a topic of  reflection for 
the entire later orthodox Brahmin literature, were ideas born into ascetic circles. These levels 
are: the level of  the microcosm, or the physical level, locating the aforementioned breath in 
the body, the macrocosmic level of  nature, locating the breath in the natural world, and the 
religious dimension, focused on the worship of  a greater power. The authors of  the Athar-
vavedic Upaniṣads discussed in this paper, especially the Praśna, underline the superiority of  
ascetic techniques and the knowledge thereof  over proficiency in even the most advanced 
ritual practices. Therefore, they point not only to the classical Upaniṣadic opposition of  rit-
ual–knowledge, but also that of: r i t u a l  / a s c e t i c  o r  y o g i c  e x e r c i s e s . The second 
contradistinction introduces new themes to the mainstream of  the Upaniṣadic reflections. In 
a manner typical of  the codifiers of  the Brahmin canon, new content from outside of  the 
mainstream is presented in the form of  the most traditional narrative. Therefore, in this case, 
six prophets — ṛṣis — visit sage Pippalada, in accordance with the tradition, as students 
requesting instruction 5 (Black 2007). Pippalada is the name of  the teacher after whom the 
school of  Atharvaveda was named. As for the questioners, who later came to live with him 
as Brahmacārin, they are representatives of  the Brahmin class, whose descent is additionally 
confirmed in other parts of  śruti. 
Below are fragments from the fourth Praśna, which touch upon the issue under analysis:
Then Sauryāyaṇī Gārgya asked him:
“Lord, which are the ones that go to sleep within a person here? Which are the ones that keep 
awake in him?
Which of  these deities sees dreams? Who experiences this bliss?
And which is the one in which all these are established?” (4.1.)
Gārgya’s question refers to the description of  the nature of  the states of  consciousness that 
are, according to Advaita, dimensions of  reality at the same time. This question instantly 
invokes an association with the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. As is widely recognized, the Māṇḍūkya 
Upaniṣad, although exceptionally concise, consisting of  only 12 verses, sums up the entire 
teachings regarding the four states of  consciousness of  the Upaniṣad canon using remarkably 
terse language, close to that which is most characteristic of  sutras. Therefore, according to 
the Māṇḍūkya, the waking state is Vaiśvanāra; dreams can be seen in the Taijasa state and bliss 
can be experienced in the state of  deep sleep — Prājňa. Due to the fact that the Māṇḍūkya 
4 A two-day panel on the Vrātyas organized during the 16th World Sanskrit Conference 2015 in Bangkok could 
serve as a testimony to the lasting or possibly renewed interest in the topic. 
5 The monography of  Brian Black although does not deal with philosophical issue but wonderfully elaborates the 
methods of  discussion between many Upaniṣadic characters, especially between teacher and pupil. 
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was deemed fundamental by Gauḍapāda and first chapter of  his work is a commentary on 
this Upanishad that is considered the foundation of  the Advaita tradition, the terminology de-
vised here is the starting point for the development of  the language of  this school of  thought. 
From a methodological standpoint, it is very helpful to compare terms from other Upaniṣads 
to the Māṇḍūkya. While analyzing the Praśna we can notice some differences in the usage 
of  terms, while some of  them also remain the same. Here the first and the second states are 
denoted by the same terms: jāgrat and svapna. However, it is not the case with the third state. 
The technical term from the Māṇḍūkya is suṣupti. In the Praśna, on the other hand, it is not 
explicitly named, instead the text contains its description. Effectively, based on those descrip-
tions, or rather metaphors, we can interpret it as the third state of  consciousness. Praśna 4.1. 
contains the expression sukham bhavati — and it can be treated analogically to the terms 
from Māṇḍūkya 5: ānanadamaya and ānandabhuk — consisting of  bliss and enjoying bliss.
He told Sauryāyaṇī:
As, when the sun is setting, all the rays of  light
gather together within that glowing orb and shoot out again every time it rises,
so, Gārgya, all of  them gather together
within the highest deity — the mind.
As a result, a person in that condition does not hear, does not see, does not smell, does not 
taste, does not feel,
does not speak, does not grasp, does not experience sexual pleasure, does not excrete, and does 
not move about.
About him people say: “He is asleep”. (4.2)
The next verse of  the Praśna indicates the same features of  the third state of  consciousness 
as Māṇḍūkya 5. Both speak of  the halted activity of  the senses, both external and inter-
nal, and of  the functioning within the realm of  mind — manasi (Praśna 4.2), cetomukha 
(Māṇḍūkya 5.) At this point one can also indicate another difference. The description in the 
Praśna is written from the outside perspective of  one’s observation of  a person in a state of  
deep sleep, while the Māṇḍūkya offers coverage referring to one’s personal experience.
It is the fires that are the breaths which keep awake in this fort.
Clearly, the householder’s fire is this in-breath,
and the southern fire is the inter-breath.
Because of  its being taken out (prāṇayama ) — since it is taken out of  the householder’s fire
— the offertorial fire is the out-breath (prāṇa ). (4.3.)
The link-breath (samāna ) gets its name from the fact that it makes these two offerings alike 
(sama) —
the exhalation and the inhalation. The patron of  the sacrifice, clearly, is the mind.
The very fruit of  the sacrifice is the up-breath, and every day it conducts the patron of  the 
sacrifice to brahman. (4.4.)
Verses 4.3 and 4.4 show how internal experiences connected with the practice of  breathing 
exercises translate into specific elements of  the sacrificial ritual. They also point out the 
three basic fires which constantly accompany a Brahmin priest: gārhapatya — the house-
holder’s fire, anvāhāryapacana — the southern fire of  the sacrifice and āhavanīya — the 
ritual fire. As explained by Śaṃkara in the commentary (Gupta 1991: 398), the sacrificial 
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fires are comparable to breaths since, as in a dream state, the sense organs are dormant and 
the life functions are sustained by breaths; hence they are similar to the fires which endlessly 
guard the householder’s fire. When the Agnihotra sacrifice is ignited, the fire is taken from 
the fireplace of  the householder’s fire, and in this sense it is called ‘sustaining’, alike to apāna. 
Just as during the Agnihotra sacrifice, the priest (hotar) maintains the balance between two 
sacrifices, two basic breaths — the inhalation and exhalation maintain the vital force of  
a human being. In this way, as Śaṃkara goes on to say, the dream of  a knower is in itself  
a performance of  Agnihotra. When a wise man sleeps, their speech and their breath give 
an offering, as do all the senses. Therefore the mind (manas) is a sacrificer and, like sacrificial 
fire, it moves upwards, invoking an association with the act of  directing the breath upwards 
in yogic procedures, which leads to liberation (Gupta 1991:399). In these verses we can see 
a classic example of  how procedures which, in a sense, do not belong to the mainstream — 
in this case the ascetic breathing exercises — are accepted into the orthodox set of  beliefs 
by relating them to a ritual.
There, in sleep, this deity experiences his greatness. He sees again whatever he has seen before;
he hears again the very things he has heard before;
and he experiences over again what he has experienced before in various places and in remote 
regions.
Being himself  of  the whole world, he sees the whole world — 
things he has seen and things he has not seen, things he has heard and things he has not heard, 
things he has experienced and things he has not experienced,
the real and the unreal. (4.5.) 
When, however, he is overpowered by heat, this deity does not see any dreams here.
Then, in this body there arises this bliss. (4.6.) 
Verses 4.5 and 4.6 concern the description of  the second and the third states of  conscious-
ness — the reality. The subject, witness, here referred to by deva — a deity, luminous — ex-
periences all the activities imagined by the mind in a dream state. They experience both what 
they have seen in the waking state and what they have not seen. They experience everything 
in the mind and those experiences are not limited by anything, such as those in reality. As 
stated by Śaṃkara, the phrase ‘experiences greatness’ should be interpreted as taking differ-
ent forms in the dream state, both subjective and objective (Gupta 1991: 400) and assuming 
that what is just an impression or product of  the imagination is real. The term ‘things he 
has experienced’ denotes ‘experienced by the mind’ and ‘things he has not experienced’ — 
what was experienced by the mind in a different life (Gupta 1991: 402). The contents of  
this Upaniṣad do not state so explicitly, but the notion pertains to the fact that the things 
we see and feel in the dream state stem from previous experiences, and the traces of  those 
are stored in the mind in the form of  saṃskāras. Those mechanisms would be subject to 
a detailed discussion in later the Yoga Sūtras but, as we can extrapolate, the authors of  the 
Upaniṣads were already familiar with such experiences and interpreted them thus. In the 
state of  svapna, the senses are kept active by means of  the mind and all vital activities are 
sustained in the same way that a priest sustains sacrificial fires.
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As birds rest on the tree where they nest,
so, my friend, all these rest on the highest self  (ātman). (4.7.)
In the state of  deep sleep of  one who has mastered all the senses, the power — or, more 
specifically, the flame it gives birth to — causes experiences which initiate other experiences, 
and hence induce karmic effects, to cease, leaving only the all-encompassing bliss. All kinds 
of  activities are united in their own basis, their origin, called here para ātman — the supreme 
ātman (4.7). Thus, we find the answer to the question asked by Gārgya, the one in which 
everything is established. The answer itself  is preceded by a description of  the process of  
consecutive, emanated entities entering into their origins.
Earth and the elements of  earth; waters and the elements of  water; fire and the elements of  fire;
wind and the elements of  wind; space and the elements of  space;
sight and visible objects; hearing and aural objects;
smell and olfactory objects; taste and gustatory objects; touch and tactile objects;
speech and the objects of  speech; hands and the objects that can be grasped;
sexual organ and objects that can be enjoyed; anus and what can be excreted;
feet and objects across which one can travel;
mind and the objects of  the mind; intellect and the objects of  the intellect;
the perception of  ego and the objects falling under that perception;
reason and the objects of  reason; light and the objects that can be illuminated;
life breath and what it can support. (4.8.)
Verse 4.8 lists the elements which enter into their origin and remain there in a latent form. 
Therefore, in the language of  Sāṃkhya, what is named are the great elements — mahābhūta, 
the subtle elements — tanmātra and the internal organ — antaḥkaraṇa, described in a fairly 
detailed manner. According to the Praśna, the internal organ consists of  more elements than 
it does in the classical interpretations of  Sāṃkhya or Yoga. The text first names the same 
components as the classical Sāṃkhya: the mind — manas, that which is the product of  the 
mind, reason — buddhi and that which is the object of  reflection, understanding, cognition, 
‘I-maker’ — ahaṁkāra, which confirms the functioning and the sense of  functioning of  the 
empirical subject. Additionally, the Upaniṣad names: consciousness, ‘awareness’ — citta — 
and the aware subject, heat, fire — tejas and all that ignites it, the life breath — prāṇa and all 
that is to be sustained by the breath. As Śaṃkara explains in the commentary (Gupta 1991: 
407), the term tejas denotes a luminous body, and is therefore different from a body under-
stood as an object of  touch. He goes on to explain that Prāṇa, in turn, is Hiranyagarbha 6. 
6 The commentary does not explain how exactly the term hiraṇyagarbha should be understood. The most straight-
forward understanding in this case would seem to be that related to the Golden Egg, but not the oldest reading, 
present in the Vedas, but what functions in Sāṃkhya philosophy, analogic to the primary function of  Prakṛti. Yet 
another way of  understanding the term hiraṇyagarbha is present in ritual ceremonies. It is a great gift, an offering 
(mahādāna) related to the primitive concept of  death and resurrection. The one making (ordering) the offering 
should bring a golden, cylindrically shaped container, step into it and assume a foetal position inside. The priest 
then repeatedly chants the mantras for conception over the golden container. Next he initiates the departure from 
the container of  the one making the offering and performs the twelve sacraments. This way the one making the 
offering receives a new body and is deemed to be reborn. This rite of  passage means a transition from one state in 
one’s life to a different one (Bhattacharya 1999: 68.) It could be then that in this fragment Hiranyagarbha as prāṇa 
means the thread which supports and helps sustain the continuity of  consciousness and the sense of  unity of  all 
elements which enter into parātman in the state of  deep sleep, and after the awakening the nāmarūpas function 
in the very same form in reality. 
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Prāṇa assumes the role of  a framework, or rather a pillar of  support for all the elements 
mentioned above, integrating them into a single unit — nāmarūpa. In the state of  deep sleep, 
they all enter into the parātman — the supreme ātman.
Even though we cannot find the same key term in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, we encounter 
a remarkably similar one. In the verse 3.2.7 7 we find the expression: vijňānamaya ātman, ‘the 
ātman made from reason, cognition’, which denotes the essence of  the empirical subject — 
this is noticeably similar to what we see in the Praśna. The absolute dimension is described 
using the exact same terms as in the Praśna: para and avyaya — imperishable. While studying 
and comparing this terminology, it is not difficult to notice the process of  consistent con-
struction of  the later technical terminology.
This intelligent self, namely the Person — who is really the one who sees, feels, hears, smells 
tastes, thinks, understands, and acts — 
rests on the highest, that is, the imperishable self, and attains the highest, the imperi-
shable. (4.9.)
Whoever perceives that shining imperishable
devoid of  shadow, body, or blood
— whoever perceives, my friend — 
knowing the whole, he becomes the whole world.
On this there is this verse: (4.10)
That on which rest the breaths and beings,
and, with all the deities, the intelligent self;
Whoever knows that, my friend, as the imperishable,
He, knowing the whole world, has entered the whole world indeed. (4.11.)
The three next — and the last — verses of  the fourth Praśna are first discussed below in gen-
eral, after which a collective interpretation is presented. Verse 9, essential for our considera-
tions, lists the functions of  a subject. The term ātman appears in it twice, along with different 
descriptions. The first ātman is the vijňānātman — the knower, puruṣa — the individual, 
which first indicated the activity of  five senses, and then the sixth is mind 8: draṣṭā — the 
seer, spraṣṭā — the toucher, śrotā — the hearer, ghrātā — the smeller, rasayitā — the taster, 
mantā — the thinker, boddhā — the determiner and kartā — the doer. This ātman rests 
in an individual and finds support in an individual; hence, it is dependent on an individual. 
The Absolute Subject, in turn — ātman can be supplemented by: para — the supreme and 
akṣara — immutable, eternal, imperishable. As Śaṃkara points out in the commentary, the 
term vijňānātman should be thought to have a broader meaning that the one suggested in 
dictionaries — one which views it as a subject whose nature is cognition itself. The appear-
ance of  the term puruṣa is then explained by him by referencing its etymology. It denotes 
that it fills — pūrṇātvāt — the entire body, meaning the whole psychophysical complex 
(Gupta 1991: 408).
7 The fifteen parts return to their due places, and all the senses — to their respective deities.
 The deeds and the ātman created from wisdom,
 all of  this becomes one in that which is supreme and imperishable.
8 It is worth noting that only five senses were named, instead of  six, which is more typical of  Buddhist than 
Brahmin thought.
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The next verse contains a description of  a correctly cognised reality, and that cognition 
becomes synonymous with liberation. The cogniser achieves the supreme — para, and the 
immutable — akṣara. Hence, this is a reiteration of  the general description from the previous 
verse. What is akṣara is recognised in: acchāyam — devoid of  shadow, aśarīram — devoid 
of  body, alohitam — devoid of  colour, blood śubhram — pure. Śaṃkara (Gupta 1991: 408) 
explains these attributes. It is ‘devoid of  shadow’, because in it (the highest, supreme) there 
is no darkness; there is no ignorance, ‘devoid of  body’, because it does not possess any 
body, as it would have intrinsic limits in the form of  nāmarūpa as well as various distinctions 
and individualities. It is ‘devoid of  colour, blood’, because it does not have any particular 
properties; hence, it can be described as ‘pure’. The one who knows all of  this becomes all 
of  it. In the Upaniṣads we can encounter the concept that we become what we imagine and 
we identify with the objects of  our cognition quite frequently — and this is reflected in this 
text 9. Desires are what drive our cognitive acts, our behaviours, and specific desires direct us 
towards specific objects. When we rid ourselves of  particular desires, everything becomes 
an object of  our cognition and he who cognises in this way becomes the whole world. The 
Upaniṣad pertains to that truth in its final section in the form of  a poem.
On the basis of  these verses that close this Praśna, it is noticeable that the primary term 
for describing the relative subject in view of  the Absolute Subject is vijňānātman. All of  the 
aforementioned attributes supplement the description of  its nature, or function. In the lan-
guage of  the Advaita system vijňānātman has the same function as the individual soul — jīva. 
This soul governs the deities — deva. This is synonymous with the term: senses — indriya. 
General consensus with the fact that they both refer to the same idea can be noticed in the 
Upaniṣads — one of  its earliest literal uses can be found in the Aitareya. Moreover, it is those 
terms that we can see listed in Praśna 4.8. The life breath — prāṇa — is indicated as the basic 
function of  the soul, attesting to its living status — jīva 10. Everything that together composes 
the psychophysical organism rests in the supreme, immutable, imperishable ātman. This 
vijňānātman, who knows those mechanisms, who knows all the elements and processes they 
are subject to, and hence all-knowing (sarvajňa) enters into this origin. The phrase from the 
previous verse is repeated here almost word-for-word; instead of  ‘becomes the whole world’, 
we read: ‘has entered the whole world’. It can be interpreted more as referring to the process, 
the mechanism of  entering, merging, instead of  focusing on the effects of  that same process.
9 Let us, for instance, recall this excerpt from Muṇḍaka:
 “Whatever world a man, whose being is purified, ponders with his mind, and whatever desires he covets;
 that very world, those very desires, he wins. (3.1.10)
 One who hankers after desires in his thoughts,
 is born here and there through his actions.
 But when one’s desires are fulfilled, and one’s self  is made perfect,
 all his desires disappear in this very world”. (3.2.2) 
10 An excellent example of  the connection between jīva and prāṇa is the following excerpt from Maitri 6.19 (from: 
Hume 1985: p. 436).
 Verily, when a knower has restrained his mind from the external,
 and the breathing spirit (prāṇa) has put to rest object of  sense,
 thereupon let him continue void of  conceptions.
 Since the living individual (jīva) who is named “breathing spirit”,
 has arisen here from what is not breathing spirit, therefore, verily, let the breathing spirit restrain his breathing 
spirit in what is called the fourth condition (turya).
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As mentioned above, what proves to be of  great help in the interpretation of  this excerpt 
is the Māṇḍūkya. Even though Gārgya’s question is formulated to ask about all states of  con-
sciousness, the analysed Praśna focuses primarily on the relation between the third and the 
fourth ones. Let us recall the terms used in Māṇḍūkya to describe the fourth, highest state 11. 
As the full phrases can be found in the footnote, I only list those which find their equivalents 
in the Praśna. The first one would be ātman, described as being akṣara. The term akṣara does 
not only denote that which is immutable, but it also a syllable which refers to the eternal, 
primal Om Mantra. This double meaning is traditionally assumed in the interpretation of  
the Māṇḍūkya, as its second part describes the four states of  consciousness by interpreting 
the components, as well as Om itself. Such an interpretation is certainly also justified in the 
analysis of  the Praśna, as this is the subject of  the fifth question. Both sources also use the 
term sarvam (everything) as a description of  a universal reality that is synonymous to Atman-
Brahman. In both texts we encounter several crucial notions which are even referred to by 
the same terms; hence, they clearly denote the fourth, highest state of  consciousness. As for 
the rest of  the words and phrases, they can be treated as their corresponding expressions. 
I will only mention one example of  two expressions referring to the same issue — concern-
ing the ultimate factor in achieving liberation. Sa sarvajňaḥ sarvam evāviveśeti — ‘He, know-
ing the whole world, has entered the whole world indeed.’ (Praśna 4.11). Ātmaiva saṁviśaty 
ātmanātmānaṁ ya evaṁ veda — ‘Anyone who knows this enters the self  (ātman) by himself  
(ātman)’ (Māṇḍūkya 12).
Let us now take a look at the notions and terms denoting the third state of  conscious-
ness. In the Māṇḍūkya 12, it is called prajňa — consciousness. The closest term in the Praśna 
is vijňānātman. Both Upaniṣads describe precisely what kind of  consciousness it is; most 
importantly, it is directed at the mind — cetomukha, instead of  outside objects, regardless 
of  whether in the state of  svapna or the state of  jāgrat. A parallel characteristic can be found 
in the Praśna (4.6): ‘this deity does not see any dreams here’. The descriptions of  the third 
state are quite detailed in the analysed Upaniṣad and have been discussed above. At this point 
I would like to consider some new elements. In addition to the term vijňānātman, the Praśna 
also offers another term — puruṣa. It is different from other terms in that it indicates a subject 
11 Om — this whole world is that syllable! Here is a further explanation of  it…
 Brahman is this self  (ātman); that [brahman] is the self  (ātman) 
 consisting of  four quarters. (1−2) 
 They consider the fourth quarter as perceiving neither what is inside nor what is outside, nor even both together;
 not as a mass of  perception, neither as perceiving nor as not perceiving;
 as unseen; as beyond the reach of  ordinary transaction; as ungraspable; as without distinguishing marks; as 
unthinkable; as indescribable;
 as one whose essence is the perception of  itself  alone; as the cessation of  the visible world; as tranquil; as auspi-
cious; as without the second.
 That is the self  (ātman), and it is that which should be perceived. (7) 
 Accordingly, the very self  (ātman) is Om.
 Anyone who knows this enters the self  (ātman) by himself  (ātman). (12) 
12 Deep sleep is when a sleeping man entertains no desires
 or sees no dreams — 
 The third quarter is Prājňa — the Intelligent One — situated in the state of  deep sleep — Deep sleep is when a sle-
eping man entertains no desires or sees no dreams — ; become one, and thus being a single mass of  perception;
 consisting of  bliss, and thus enjoying bliss; and having thought as his mouth. (5) 
 He is the Lord of  all; he is the knower of  all; he is the inner controller; he is the womb of  all — 
 for he is the origin and the dissolution of  beings. (6) 
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understood anthropomorphically. In this context, the analogical term in the Māṇḍūkya 
would be sarveśvara — Lord of  the entire universe. I do not wish to conduct a detailed 
analysis compiling the differences and similarities between the words puruṣa and īśvara in the 
Upaniṣads or later schools of  Vedānta; I shall only point to the issues which are most crucial 
to our considerations. As I have already indicated in the introduction, I am assuming the 
perspective of  the Advaita; nevertheless, I do feel that the standpoint of  the Sagunic Vedanta 
could prove difficult to defend. According to the Advaita Vedānta and the fragments of  the 
Upaniṣads referred to by the advocates of  this school of  thought, the depicted universe we, 
as non-liberated individuals, perceive as real, emerged as a result of  an initial cognitive er-
ror 13. As a consequence of  this primary cognitive act which is, in a sense, a self-cognitive act, 
the first depiction emerges — a very subtle subject that has also simultaneously become an 
object. There are many names for the first depiction but two very common terms describing 
it can be found in the Praśna; deva — luminous, a deity and puruṣa. Moreover, they can be 
treated as different names for the soul — jīva. In the Advaita the level of  many individual 
souls is also additionally assumed to have a governor of  sorts, named Iśvara — the Lord.
Here we arrive at the essential difference between the two Upaniṣads. T h e  d e s c r i p -
t i o n  i n  t h e  P r a ś n a  i s  w r i t t e n  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  a n  i n d i -
v i d u a l  o b s e r v e r  a n d, l i k e w i s e, i t  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  a n 
i n d i v i d u a l .  T h e  M ā ṇ ḍ ū k y a, o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d, b y  i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e 
c h a r a c t e r  o f  I ś v a r a  a n d  i n d i c a t i n g  h i s  r o l e  i n  s u s t a i n i n g  b a l a n c e  i n 
t h e  w o r l d, i n c l u d e s  a  c o s m o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e, i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l, y o g i c  d i m e n s i o n .
The aim of  the above analysis is to show the way the image of  the world assumed by the 
philosophers of  the Advaita Vedanta school of  thought was shaped through individual expe-
rience. It also presents the road towards the elaboration of  a relatively common terminology, 
while regarding the process of  change in the meaning and significance of  specific words, 
moving from Upanishadic towards becoming technical terms, especially for those elements 
of  Advaitic vocabulary which used to be supplementary epithets. Finally, it demonstrates 
how the experiences of  certain Upaniṣadic sages were compiled into a single body — the 
philosophy of  the Advaita Vedānta, initiated by Gauḍapāda’s commentary on the Māṇḍūya 
Upaniṣad.
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